A-Pay Protocol MCP server
io.github.neuralaisofficial-lang/apayneuralaisofficial-langstreamable-httpv0.1.8Scanned
Universal HTTP 402 Micropayment Protocol & Autonomous Economic Settlement Engine for AI Agents
5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the A-Pay Protocol MCP server can do
The A-Pay Protocol MCP server is published by the GitHub account neuralaisofficial-lang. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: apay_request and apay_set_budget), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (apay_inspect_endpoint); 2 tools can send data out of your system (apay_request and apay_inspect_endpoint).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.8.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
apay_requestProbe and automatically pay HTTP 402 crypto micropayments on Base Layer 2 with USDC or $APAY within pre-configured budget limits.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "apay_request" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Probe and automatically pay HTTP 402 crypto micropayments on Base Layer 2 with USDC or $APAY within pre-configured budget limits.
apay_set_budgetConfigure agent safety invariants and spending guardrails.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "apay_set_budget" says "set": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Configure agent safety invariants and spending guardrails. Prevents runaway loops or overcharging.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
apay_get_balanceInspect the agent's live on-chain balances on Base Layer 2, including native ETH (for gas), USDC, and $APAY tokens.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "apay_get_balance" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect the agent's live on-chain balances on Base Layer 2, including native ETH (for gas), USDC, and $APAY tokens.
apay_get_wallet_statusInspect the agent's active non-custodial wallet address, network, current spending guardrails, and total spent in USDC and $APAY.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "apay_get_wallet_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect the agent's active non-custodial wallet address, network, current spending guardrails, and total spent in USDC and $APAY.
apay_inspect_endpointInspect an endpoint to check if it requires an A-Pay micropayment, inspect the exact price quote, currency, and payout receiver without spending any funds.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "apay_inspect_endpoint" says "inspect": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspect an endpoint to check if it requires an A-Pay micropayment, inspect the exact price quote, currency, and payout receiver without spending any funds.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://apay-network.vercel.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including apay_request (destructive), apay_set_budget (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- Protocol version: 2024-11-05 to 2025-06-18
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Protocol version: 2024-11-05 -> 2025-06-18.View diff
- Protocol version: 2024-11-05 to 2025-06-18
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.8. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http apay https://apay-network.vercel.app/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http apay https://apay-network.vercel.app/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__apay__apay_get_wallet_status",
"mcp__apay__apay_get_balance"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__apay__apay_request",
"mcp__apay__apay_set_budget",
"mcp__apay__apay_inspect_endpoint"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as apay. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__apay__apay_request outbound
- mcp__apay__apay_inspect_endpoint untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.neuralaisofficial-lang/apay/verify?hash=dc35bb16e49838bb57471e757d28a9650e07c02072aaf61452f92992d40e9428" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash dc35bb16e498, from Nov 20, 2026, 04:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.neuralaisofficial-lang/apay/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.neuralaisofficial-lang/apay)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:42 UTC.
A-Pay Protocol MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the A-Pay Protocol MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the A-Pay Protocol MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the A-Pay Protocol MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the A-Pay Protocol MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. apay_request, apay_set_budget, apay_get_wallet_status, apay_inspect_endpoint and apay_get_balance.
Does the A-Pay Protocol MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the A-Pay Protocol MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): apay_request and apay_inspect_endpoint.
Has the A-Pay Protocol MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.