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Razi Document Tools MCP server

io.github.razikallayi/razi-documentsrazikallayistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Document processing over MCP: merge, split and compress PDFs, run OCR, extract document text.

6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 5 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 5 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Razi Document Tools MCP server can do

The Razi Document Tools MCP server is published by the GitHub account razikallayi. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (merge_pdf) and create or change data (5 tools: split_pdf, compress_pdf, images_to_pdf, extract_text_ocr and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • merge_pdfConcatenate two or more PDFs into a single PDF, in the order supplied, and return the merged file.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "merge_pdf" says "merge": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Concatenate two or more PDFs into a single PDF, in the order supplied, and return the merged file. Over MCP the PDF is never inlined: it comes back as a stored URL that stays retrievable for about 24 hours. Page content is copied unchanged — it does not compress (use compress_pdf) or select pages (use split_pdf). Fewer than two files is rejected. Every input must already be a PDF; a photo handed to this tool is rejected rather than converted. Use images_to_pdf when any input is a picture — it takes PDFs alongside them and splices both in one pass. There is no upload channel over MCP: pass `fileUrls`, an array of URLs in razi.pro's own storage; third-party URLs are rejected. Obtain such a URL by uploading the file over the REST API first (POST /api/v1/tools/execute with the file attached). Over the REST API the files may instead be attached as multipart/form-data. Limited to 20 merges per hour per IP.
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • compress_pdfShrink a PDF's byte size while keeping it a PDF, for email limits or slow connections.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Shrink a PDF's byte size while keeping it a PDF, for email limits or slow connections. Returns the compressed PDF; over MCP it is never inlined, arriving as a stored URL that stays retrievable for about 24 hours. Ghostscript on razi.pro's worker downsamples embedded images at a fixed 'ebook' preset — lossy, with no quality knob. Compression is not guaranteed: if the worker is unavailable the fallback only rewrites the file with object streams, which typically saves almost nothing, and when nothing can be saved the original bytes are returned unchanged. PDFs only: an image or a video is rejected, and neither can be re-encoded anywhere on this server. Paid compute; 20 calls per hour per IP; a large file can take minutes. There is no upload channel over MCP: pass `fileUrl`, a URL in razi.pro's own storage; third-party URLs are rejected. Obtain one by uploading the PDF over the REST API first (POST /api/v1/tools/execute with the file attached).
  • extract_text_ocrUse this ONLY when the text exists as PIXELS and nothing else — a photo, a screenshot, a scan.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this ONLY when the text exists as PIXELS and nothing else — a photo, a screenshot, a scan. It runs optical character recognition on an image and GUESSES the characters, so it is a best-effort transcription that misreads under blur, skew or low contrast. Returns JSON { text, language, confidence? }. If the file already stores real characters, this is the wrong tool and will be less accurate: parse_document reads them exactly. The deciding question is what the bytes contain, never the file extension — a .png of a letter needs this tool, a .txt never does. Layout is not preserved — no tables, columns or coordinates, just a flat string. Paid compute; 20 calls per hour per IP. There is no upload channel over MCP: pass `fileUrl`, a URL in razi.pro's own storage; third-party URLs are rejected. Obtain one by uploading the image over the REST API first (POST /api/v1/tools/execute with the file attached).
  • images_to_pdfAssemble pictures into one PDF, a page per picture, in the order supplied.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Assemble pictures into one PDF, a page per picture, in the order supplied. PNG and JPEG bytes are embedded untouched; WebP, GIF, TIFF and AVIF are re-encoded to PNG on the way in, which loses no detail but does rewrite the file. A PDF sitting among the pictures is spliced in whole at its position, so a photo/contract/photo sequence takes one call. Each page defaults to the pixel dimensions of its picture, so nothing is scaled, cropped or letterboxed; choose 'a4' or 'letter' instead to centre every picture on a fixed portrait sheet, optionally inside a `margin` of blank points. Ceilings per call: 100 files, and 50MB summed across all of them, at 20 calls an hour per IP. Bytes that cannot be decoded as a picture — a spreadsheet, a video, a corrupt upload — earn an HTTP 400 naming the offending file; a blank page is never substituted to hide one. Output is the finished PDF: raw bytes over REST, and over MCP a link to the stored document that keeps working for roughly a day. MCP carries no attachments, so name the pictures with `fileUrls` — an ordered array of links inside razi.pro's own storage. Links elsewhere on the internet are refused. Mint them by POSTing the pictures to /api/v1/tools/execute first, where they may simply be attached.
  • parse_documentUse this when the file ALREADY stores its text as characters: it decodes them and returns JSON { text, metadata } verbatim, with no guessing involved.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when the file ALREADY stores its text as characters: it decodes them and returns JSON { text, metadata } verbatim, with no guessing involved. That exactness is the whole difference from extract_text_ocr, which recovers text from pixels by guessing at glyph shapes and should only ever be pointed at a photo, screenshot or scan. Supported: .txt, decoded as UTF-8 and returned in full with metadata { format: "txt", words }; and .pdf, where the text layer is read page by page and joined with a `--- Page N ---` separator, returning metadata { format: "pdf", pages, words } — pages and words are counted from the document itself, never estimated. .docx and every other extension are rejected with 400. A scanned or photographed PDF has no text layer, so nothing can be extracted from it here; that case returns 422 with a metadata.imageOnly flag rather than an empty success, and extract_text_ocr is the tool for it. Limits: 50MB and 300 pages, over which the call returns 413; an unreadable or encrypted PDF returns 400. Layout is not preserved — no tables, columns or coordinates, just a flat string per page. The file type is decided by the filename extension, not by inspecting the bytes. 10 calls per minute per caller. There is no upload channel over MCP: pass `fileUrl`, a URL in razi.pro's own storage; third-party URLs are rejected. Obtain one by uploading the file over the REST API first (POST /api/v1/tools/execute with the file attached).
  • split_pdfExtract page ranges from one PDF into new PDFs.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract page ranges from one PDF into new PDFs. One output file is produced per range: a single range returns that PDF directly, several ranges return a ZIP containing one PDF each. Over MCP you receive a link to the stored output rather than its bytes, and that link keeps working for roughly a day. Pages are copied verbatim — this does not reduce file size (use compress_pdf) and it cannot rasterise pages into images, which is a browser-only feature of razi.pro. Every output stays a PDF. There is no upload channel over MCP: pass `fileUrl`, a URL in razi.pro's own storage; third-party URLs are rejected. Obtain one by uploading the PDF over the REST API first, where it may instead be attached as multipart/form-data. Limited to 20 splits per hour per IP.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
6
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.razi.pro/api/mcp/documents: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including merge_pdf (irreversible), split_pdf (write), compress_pdf (write), images_to_pdf (write), extract_text_ocr (write) and 1 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 6
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 6 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 6
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 6 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http razi-documents https://www.razi.pro/api/mcp/documents
claude mcp add --transport http razi-documents https://www.razi.pro/api/mcp/documents

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__razi-documents__merge_pdf",
      "mcp__razi-documents__split_pdf",
      "mcp__razi-documents__compress_pdf",
      "mcp__razi-documents__images_to_pdf",
      "mcp__razi-documents__extract_text_ocr",
      "mcp__razi-documents__parse_document"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as razi-documents. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.razikallayi/razi-documents/verify?hash=c633bdbd895f74b8700aeb61c5139c38846fc9170b573c990e4fc4bb933cfbee" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c633bdbd895f, from Nov 20, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.razikallayi/razi-documents/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.razikallayi/razi-documents
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.razikallayi/razi-documents.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.razikallayi/razi-documents)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.

Razi Document Tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Razi Document Tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Razi Document Tools MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Razi Document Tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: merge_pdf.

What tools does the Razi Document Tools MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 irreversible, 5 write. merge_pdf, split_pdf, compress_pdf, images_to_pdf, extract_text_ocr and parse_document.

Does the Razi Document Tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Razi Document Tools MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Razi Document Tools MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.