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Razi Web Tools MCP server

io.github.razikallayi/razi-webrazikallayistreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Web and URL utilities over MCP: shorten URLs, screenshot pages, read page metadata, encode URLs.

6 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 5
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Razi Web Tools MCP server can do

The Razi Web Tools MCP server is published by the GitHub account razikallayi. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (screenshot_url) and create or change data (3 tools: shorten_url, encode_url and decode_url), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (screenshot_url, fetch_site_logo and fetch_page_metadata); 5 tools can send data out of your system (shorten_url, screenshot_url, fetch_site_logo and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention and long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • screenshot_urlCapture a screenshot of any public web page, rendered in a real headless browser so JavaScript, web fonts and lazy-loaded images all appear.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot": a word for reading.
    • The description's first verb is "capture": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe name "screenshot_url" says "screenshot" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "capture" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...s in a fresh browser with no cookies or credentials, so anything behind a login is unreacha..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Capture a screenshot of any public web page, rendered in a real headless browser so JavaScript, web fonts and lazy-loaded images all appear. Returns JSON with a hosted image URL — not image bytes: { url, screenshotUrl (the same value under the older key), width, height, format, bytes, cached, source }. When source is "vps" the image is on razi.pro's CDN and every field is populated, except that height is null for a fullPage capture. If source is "thumbio" the renderer was unavailable and a third-party fallback produced the image: the URL points at image.thum.io rather than razi.pro, only width accompanies it (height, format and bytes are absent), and the fullPage, format, darkMode and delayMs options were ignored. Public pages only: every capture runs in a fresh browser with no cookies or credentials, so anything behind a login is unreachable, and a URL that is not http(s) or that resolves to a loopback, private or link-local address is refused with 400. Identical requests are cached for 7 days and return the same image (cached: true), so this cannot be used to poll a page for changes. Out-of-range numeric options are clamped to their stated range rather than rejected. Other failures: 429 over either rate limit, 403 when screenshots are switched off platform-wide, 502 when the render fails and no fallback is available. This is the most expensive call on the platform: it holds a whole browser worker for up to 50 seconds. Limited to 10 captures per minute and 100 per day per IP.
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • decode_urlReverse percent-encoding with decodeURIComponent, turning %20-style escapes back into the characters they stand for.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Reverse percent-encoding with decodeURIComponent, turning %20-style escapes back into the characters they stand for. Returns JSON { decoded }. A malformed or truncated escape sequence is rejected with an error rather than passed through. Note that '+' is left as a literal plus, not converted to a space. It understands percent-escapes and nothing else: Base64 text and JWTs pass through unchanged or fail, rather than being decoded. It is the exact inverse of encode_url.
  • encode_urlPercent-encode a string with encodeURIComponent so reserved characters survive transport inside a URL.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Percent-encode a string with encodeURIComponent so reserved characters survive transport inside a URL. Returns JSON { encoded }. It escapes the structural characters too — : / ? # & = all become %XX — so it is for a single query-string value or path segment, NOT for a whole address you still want to be clickable. This is escaping for URLs only. It is the wrong transform for making binary-unsafe content fit in JSON, an HTTP header or a data URI, which call for Base64 rather than percent-encoding. Reverse it with decode_url.
  • shorten_urlCreate a permanent razi.pro short link that redirects to a long URL.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a permanent razi.pro short link that redirects to a long URL. Returns JSON { code, shortUrl } and nothing else. Visits through the link are counted, but no tool here reads that count back, and the link cannot be edited, retargeted or deleted through this API. It never expires. The destination is stored, never fetched or checked for reachability, so a dead or mistyped URL still yields a working short link. Only http and https targets are accepted. This shortens an existing address; it does not host anything, so a file needs a public URL of its own before there is something to shorten. No sign-in is required; an anonymous call creates the link unowned, so it will not appear in any account's list. 30 links per hour per IP, then 429.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • fetch_page_metadataRead a web page's metadata without downloading any images.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_page_metadata" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a web page's metadata without downloading any images. Returns JSON { url, finalUrl, title, description, siteName, canonical, lang, themeColor, author, generator, feeds, openGraph, twitter, icons, cached }, where `feeds` is an array of RSS/Atom URLs, `openGraph` and `twitter` are the complete tag sets as string maps, and any tag the page does not declare is simply omitted. `icons` is always an empty array here because icon resolution is switched off — call fetch_site_logo when the caller wants a logo, favicon or icon. `finalUrl` is the address after redirects (up to 3 hops are followed), which is how you resolve where a domain actually points. This is the fast, cheap counterpart to fetch_site_logo: one page fetch and no image work. It reads the served HTML only — it runs no JavaScript, so a client-rendered page may expose little, and it does not capture how the page looks (use screenshot_url for that). The crawler identifies itself as RaziMetadataBot, and HTTP status is not checked, so a 404 or bot-challenge page that serves HTML is parsed as though it were the page you asked for. Errors: 400 for a URL that is refused as unsafe, redirects too many times, does not return HTML, or exceeds the 5MB page cap; 504 if the page does not answer within 10 seconds; 502 otherwise. Results are cached for 24 hours and replayed with cached: true; 20 calls per minute per IP, then 429.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out5
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.razi.pro/api/mcp/web: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including screenshot_url (irreversible), shorten_url (write), encode_url (write), decode_url (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. Nov 6, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...s in a fresh browser with no cookies or credentials, so anything behind a login is unreacha..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description is 2,025 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

    Matched text

    description ends: "...or 24 hours and replayed with cached: true; 20 calls per minute per IP, then 429."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 4 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 4
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 402; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 402
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 4 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http razi-web https://www.razi.pro/api/mcp/web
claude mcp add --transport http razi-web https://www.razi.pro/api/mcp/web

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__razi-web__shorten_url",
      "mcp__razi-web__screenshot_url",
      "mcp__razi-web__fetch_site_logo",
      "mcp__razi-web__fetch_page_metadata",
      "mcp__razi-web__encode_url",
      "mcp__razi-web__decode_url"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as razi-web. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__razi-web__shorten_url outbound
  • mcp__razi-web__screenshot_url untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__razi-web__fetch_site_logo untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__razi-web__fetch_page_metadata untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__razi-web__encode_url outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.razikallayi/razi-web/verify?hash=c0f76262da86bf201505b677e8be35b52d3a23655bb73c07ed0f1ec8fc96dc3e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c0f76262da86, from Nov 21, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.razikallayi/razi-web/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.razikallayi/razi-web
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.razikallayi/razi-web.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.razikallayi/razi-web)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.

Razi Web Tools MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Razi Web Tools MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Razi Web Tools MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Razi Web Tools MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: screenshot_url.

What tools does the Razi Web Tools MCP server have?

6 tools: 1 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read. screenshot_url, shorten_url, encode_url, decode_url, fetch_site_logo and fetch_page_metadata.

Does the Razi Web Tools MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Razi Web Tools MCP server send data to outside services?

5 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): shorten_url, screenshot_url, fetch_site_logo, fetch_page_metadata and encode_url.

Has the Razi Web Tools MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.