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Cluster & Consensus MCP server

io.github.theharrisontruong-web/clustertheharrisontruong-webstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Tracked-wallet cluster detection + 0-100 consensus score for Solana/Base tokens. $0.02/call.

4 tools: 4 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Cluster & Consensus MCP server can do

The Cluster & Consensus MCP server is published by the GitHub account theharrisontruong-web. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: cluster_check, cluster_check_lite, cluster_feed and cluster_feed_lite), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (cluster_check, cluster_check_lite, cluster_feed and 1 more).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (base64-blob). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • cluster_checkFull cluster & consensus report for ONE token (Solana mint or Base contract address; chain auto-detected).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 44-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...mint (base58, e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump) or a Base contract..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full cluster & consensus report for ONE token (Solana mint or Base contract address; chain auto-detected). Detects whether tracked smart-money wallets are converging on the token in the last 24h: tracked buyer/seller counts, per-wallet cluster events (side, tx count, estimated USD, first/last seen), tracked net USD flow, tracked wallets sitting in the top-holder list, and a 0-100 consensus score with a STRONG / FORMING / QUIET / EXITING signal and a stated confidence. Fuses a safety summary (RugCheck on Solana, GoPlus on Base) and a canonical check: for tokens trading on a registered narrative name (NEET at launch) it states CANONICAL or CLONE and names the real contract — ticker copies are industrial-scale and resolving the real one is the toll. FAIL-CLOSED AND HONEST ABOUT COVERAGE: Solana cluster detection is sample-based (a bounded sample of recent main-pool transactions intersected with the tracked set); every report states signatures seen, transactions parsed and the sample span, and missing sources cap confidence and are named in data_gaps — a consensus score is only produced when real cluster data answered. Base support is holder-overlap plus a bounded transfer-log scan and is labelled a weaker signal. The tracked set is derived from public data (repeat cross-token buyers on public RPC flow + GoPlus holder lists), shipped as data and rebuildable. Cost: $0.02 USDC per call via x402 (Base settlement; Solana settlement when configured) — no API key needed. Use it before apeing into any social-driven token: are the wallets that matter already in, still entering, or leaving?

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • cluster_check_liteFREE lite cluster & consensus report for one token (Solana mint or Base contract).Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 44-character base64 string.

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...mint (base58, e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump) or a Base contract..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE lite cluster & consensus report for one token (Solana mint or Base contract). Top-line only: consensus score, signal, tracked buyer/seller counts, tracked net USD, canonical status and the safety band — events, holder overlap and coverage detail are capped. Use it to triage whether a token deserves the full cluster_check report.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • cluster_feedFull cluster board: the tokens with ACTIVE tracked-wallet cluster events right now, ranked by consensus score.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full cluster board: the tokens with ACTIVE tracked-wallet cluster events right now, ranked by consensus score. Candidates come from DexScreener's public attention feeds (boosts + latest profiles, Solana) plus registered narrative canonicals; each candidate is cluster-scanned live and only tokens with real tracked-wallet activity make the board. Per token: consensus score, signal, tracked buyers/sellers, tracked net USD, safety band, canonical status. An empty board is a real answer — it means no cluster events were detected in the current candidate set, not an error. This is the in-loop product: poll it to catch convergence as it forms. Cost: $0.02 USDC per call via x402 — no API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • cluster_feed_liteFREE lite cluster board: tokens with active cluster events right now (address, symbol, consensus score, signal, tracked buyer count only — net flow, sellers, safety and canonical d…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    FREE lite cluster board: tokens with active cluster events right now (address, symbol, consensus score, signal, tracked buyer count only — net flow, sellers, safety and canonical detail are capped). The full cluster_feed board adds the detail.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://cluster-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including cluster_check (write), cluster_check_lite (write), cluster_feed (write), cluster_feed_lite (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 44-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...mint (base58, e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump) or a Base contract..."

    What this check looks for
  • The input schema at properties.address.description contains a 44-character base64 string.

    Matched text

    inputSchema.properties.address.description: "...mint (base58, e.g. Ce2gx9KGXJ6C9Mp5b5x1sn9Mg87JwEbrQby4Zqo3pump) or a Base contract..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http cluster https://cluster-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http cluster https://cluster-al6bxcngia-ue.a.run.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__cluster__cluster_check",
      "mcp__cluster__cluster_check_lite",
      "mcp__cluster__cluster_feed",
      "mcp__cluster__cluster_feed_lite"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as cluster. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__cluster__cluster_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__cluster__cluster_check_lite untrusted-input
  • mcp__cluster__cluster_feed untrusted-input
  • mcp__cluster__cluster_feed_lite untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/cluster/verify?hash=4a10192c52c0aa3b133ea61d3d53bc9c5b62d6fe219009d9e3dbb719e8d940e9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4a10192c52c0, from Nov 17, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/cluster/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.theharrisontruong-web/cluster
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/cluster.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theharrisontruong-web/cluster)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 17, 2026, 06:17 UTC.

Cluster & Consensus MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Cluster & Consensus MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Cluster & Consensus MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Cluster & Consensus MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Cluster & Consensus MCP server have?

4 tools: 4 write. cluster_check, cluster_check_lite, cluster_feed and cluster_feed_lite.

Does the Cluster & Consensus MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Cluster & Consensus MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Cluster & Consensus MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.