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Zovo PDF Sign MCP server

io.github.theluckystrike/pdf-signtheluckystrikestreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Puts a visible signature, initials and a date on a PDF document you attach.

2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server can do

The Zovo PDF Sign MCP server is published by the GitHub account theluckystrike. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: sign_pdf), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (find_signature_spots).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • sign_pdfUse this when the user wants to sign a PDF, e-sign a document, add a signature, initials or a date to a PDF, or put their name on a signature line.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when the user wants to sign a PDF, e-sign a document, add a signature, initials or a date to a PDF, or put their name on a signature line. It draws a visible mark on a copy of the user's PDF at found spots (ids from find_signature_spots) or at a page and position: a drawn signature (SVG path from the widget pad) or a typed name in an italic font, initials, a date in the chosen format from the user's date, or short text. It returns the signed copy as a download kept for about 1 hour and checks that each mark is in the file. It is not a certified digital signature: no certificate, identity check or audit trail. Does not fill form fields with data and does not send the document to anyone. Do not use for certificate-based digital signatures or for signing on someone else's behalf without their consent.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Sign a PDF
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • find_signature_spotsUse this when the user wants to sign a PDF, fill in a signature line, find where to sign, or add initials or a date to a PDF form or contract.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_signature_spots" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use this when the user wants to sign a PDF, fill in a signature line, find where to sign, or add initials or a date to a PDF form or contract. It reads the PDF's text positions and lists each place labelled Signature, Sign here, Signed, Initials, Date or Name, each blank ____ line, and each empty signature form field, with page, x, y (points from the top-left as displayed), width and a spot id for sign_pdf. Makes no file. Up to 15 MB; the first 50 pages are searched. Does not read scanned PDFs without a text layer (then give page and position to sign_pdf). Do not use for reading or summarizing a contract.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Find signature spots
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 8, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://pdf-sign.zovo.one/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including sign_pdf (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http pdf-sign https://pdf-sign.zovo.one/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http pdf-sign https://pdf-sign.zovo.one/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__pdf-sign__find_signature_spots"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__pdf-sign__sign_pdf"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as pdf-sign. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__pdf-sign__find_signature_spots private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.theluckystrike/pdf-sign/verify?hash=236bd67300084e54e5d3979e4d43657580596178adf089d53a8f29314440ad49" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 236bd6730008, from Nov 8, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theluckystrike/pdf-sign/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.theluckystrike/pdf-sign
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.theluckystrike/pdf-sign.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.theluckystrike/pdf-sign)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Zovo PDF Sign MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server have?

2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. sign_pdf and find_signature_spots.

Does the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Zovo PDF Sign MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.