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falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server

io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-docsygfalconstreamable-httpv1.1.1Scanned

Bank statement extraction for agents: transactions, ADB, NSF, MCA metrics, plus invoices. x402.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 4
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server can do

The falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server is published by the GitHub account ygfalcon. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: extract_document, spread_bank_statement and pdf_to_text), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (preview_document); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (preview_document); 4 tools can send data out of your system (preview_document, extract_document, spread_bank_statement and 1 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • extract_documentFull extraction of all pages.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full extraction of all pages. Costs $0.03 USDC (x402).
  • pdf_to_textPDF to plain text or markdown, page by page (text-layer PDFs only).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    PDF to plain text or markdown, page by page (text-layer PDFs only). Costs $0.0025 USDC (x402).
  • spread_bank_statementBank statement → every transaction + underwriting metrics (ADB, NSF, MCA/loan positions, revenue trend, DSCR inputs, tamper flags).Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Bank statement → every transaction + underwriting metrics (ADB, NSF, MCA/loan positions, revenue trend, DSCR inputs, tamper flags). Costs $0.40 USDC (x402).
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • preview_documentFree: extract page 1 of a PDF (auto-detects invoice/receipt/PO/W-9/bank statement) with per-field confidence.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "preview_document" says "preview": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "preview_document" says "preview" and "document": it reads documents.
    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file_base64), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Free: extract page 1 of a PDF (auto-detects invoice/receipt/PO/W-9/bank statement) with per-field confidence.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

4 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 untrusted-input tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out4
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__falcon-docs__preview_document"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 31, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://falcon-docs.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including extract_document (write), spread_bank_statement (write), pdf_to_text (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 31, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 removed, 1 changed.−1 removed~1 changedView diff
    • Removed:ocr_document
    • Changed:pdf_to_textChanges thingsdescription
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 3.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 3
  3. Tools2 added, 1 changed.+2 added~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http falcon-docs https://falcon-docs.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http falcon-docs https://falcon-docs.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__falcon-docs__preview_document",
      "mcp__falcon-docs__extract_document",
      "mcp__falcon-docs__spread_bank_statement",
      "mcp__falcon-docs__pdf_to_text"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as falcon-docs. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__falcon-docs__preview_document private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__falcon-docs__extract_document outbound
  • mcp__falcon-docs__spread_bank_statement outbound
  • mcp__falcon-docs__pdf_to_text outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-docs/verify?hash=f8fe2187908a06f149a604d960d0b0006cf79eabfcdbca2a5cb3675c4819f6cb" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f8fe2187908a, from Nov 12, 2026, 10:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-docs/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-docs
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-docs.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-docs)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 17:18 UTC.

falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. extract_document, spread_bank_statement, pdf_to_text and preview_document.

Does the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server send data to outside services?

4 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): preview_document, extract_document, spread_bank_statement and pdf_to_text.

Has the falcon.sol docs: bank statement extraction for agents (x402) MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.