Falcon Shield MCP server
io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-shieldygfalconstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Pre-sign Solana tx guard for agents: ALLOW/WARN/BLOCK verdict, x402 USDC pay-per-call.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Falcon Shield MCP server can do
The Falcon Shield MCP server is published by the GitHub account ygfalcon. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: shield_guard_check), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
shield_guard_checkUse this before an agent or wallet signs a Solana transaction.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use this before an agent or wallet signs a Solana transaction. Decodes the unsigned or signed transaction and returns NO_MATCH (no known-bad pattern matched; not a safety guarantee), WARN, or BLOCK, with plain-language reasons and a signed receipt. Pass an x402 quote to also check a payment transaction against it (overpay, approve-instead-of-transfer, unchecked Transfer, wrong payee). Errors return ERROR and are never charged. Price $0.009 USDC (x402, Solana).
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 30, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://falcon-shield.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including shield_guard_check (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
- Changed:shield_guard_checkChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http falcon-shield https://falcon-shield.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http falcon-shield https://falcon-shield.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__falcon-shield__shield_guard_check"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as falcon-shield. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-shield/verify?hash=e0cb28f0ba9dd3e40a1b84dfee69dacca92253cd9b21a22ee9c2702314fab7de" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e0cb28f0ba9d, from Nov 12, 2026, 11:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-shield/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ygfalcon/falcon-shield)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 18:17 UTC.
Falcon Shield MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Falcon Shield MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Falcon Shield MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Falcon Shield MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Falcon Shield MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. shield_guard_check.
Does the Falcon Shield MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Falcon Shield MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Falcon Shield MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.