Preflight MCP server
com.allthepossibles/preflightallthepossibles.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Scans an MCP server for security gaps before your agent connects. Free tier, no signup.
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Preflight MCP server can do
The Preflight MCP server is published by allthepossibles.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: scan_mcp_server, scan_content, scan_extension and check_output), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_mcp_server, scan_content and scan_extension); 2 tools can send data out of your system (scan_mcp_server and scan_content).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
check_outputCheck a structured output you're about to return or act on for degenerate-answer patterns a schema check can't see: invalid JSON, a placeholder value ('TBD', 'N/A', 'unknown') wher…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a structured output you're about to return or act on for degenerate-answer patterns a schema check can't see: invalid JSON, a placeholder value ('TBD', 'N/A', 'unknown') where a real answer should be, an array of byte-identical items (a common symptom of a loop that never advanced), or an expected field that's missing or empty. Schema validity and answer quality are different guarantees, call this before trusting your own output, not just after validating it parses.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
scan_contentCheck a document or web page for hidden instructions before an agent reads, summarizes, or acts on it: invisible Unicode, obfuscated payloads, and (on Pro) a semantic pass for prom…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a document or web page for hidden instructions before an agent reads, summarizes, or acts on it: invisible Unicode, obfuscated payloads, and (on Pro) a semantic pass for prompt-injection phrasing aimed at the model instead of the human reader. Pass either a URL to fetch, or raw text you already have.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scan_extensionCheck a VS Code extension or a Claude Skill before installing or trusting it.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...engine scan_content uses), unscoped or credential-referencing tool grants in its allowed-..."
Description, as the server wrote it Check a VS Code extension or a Claude Skill before installing or trusting it. For a VS Code extension (which runs with full Node.js access and no permission model to scope): publisher domain-verification status weighed against install count, and known-bad-signature checks on its description. For a Claude Skill: hidden-instruction and obfuscated-payload detection on the SKILL.md body (the same engine scan_content uses), unscoped or credential-referencing tool grants in its allowed-tools/disallowed-tools frontmatter, inline shell execution baked into the file itself, and pattern matching on any bundled script files for credential-exfiltration signatures. Semantic prompt-injection detection on a skill's body runs too on Pro.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
scan_mcp_serverCheck an MCP server for real risk signals before trusting it: unauthenticated transport, capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad si…Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad..."
Description, as the server wrote it Check an MCP server for real risk signals before trusting it: unauthenticated transport, capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad signatures. Pass a live server URL, or a manifest of tool definitions if the server isn't reachable over HTTP. Semantic prompt-injection detection runs too if a Pro API key is sent as an Authorization: Bearer header, see /docs.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including scan_mcp_server (write), scan_content (write), scan_extension (write), check_output (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infoscan_mcp_server
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad..."
- Infoscan_extension
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...engine scan_content uses), unscoped or credential-referencing tool grants in its allowed-..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http preflight https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http preflight https://preflight.allthepossibles.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__preflight__scan_mcp_server",
"mcp__preflight__scan_content",
"mcp__preflight__scan_extension",
"mcp__preflight__check_output"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as preflight. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__preflight__scan_mcp_server untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__preflight__scan_content untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__preflight__scan_extension untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.allthepossibles/preflight/verify?hash=a879766052552057e9ff76ae2e8a7ba9e817d9d655d64c2d492ec1be0358f693" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a87976605255, from Nov 11, 2026, 14:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.allthepossibles/preflight/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.allthepossibles/preflight)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 30, 2026, 00:17 UTC.
Preflight MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Preflight MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Preflight MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Preflight MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Preflight MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. scan_mcp_server, scan_content, scan_extension and check_output.
Does the Preflight MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Preflight MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): scan_mcp_server and scan_content.
Has the Preflight MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.