Skip to content

Mend MCP server

com.clawhard/mendclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Repair broken JSON without changing values, find the exact error, outline or query big payloads.

3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 2 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Mend MCP server can do

The Mend MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: mend_repair_json and mend_outline_json), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

1 tool reads private data (mend_query_json); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (mend_query_json).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • mend_outline_jsonUse when you are about to read a big JSON response, log or export into context, before loading it: returns a compact outline of the structure (keys, types, array lengths, one examp…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when you are about to read a big JSON response, log or export into context, before loading it: returns a compact outline of the structure (keys, types, array lengths, one example per repeated shape) so you can plan a query without spending tokens on the whole document. Repairs the JSON first if needed. Follow with mend_query_json to pull only the values you need. Up to 100,000 characters.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Outline the structure of a large JSON payload
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • mend_repair_jsonUse when JSON from an LLM, API, log, config or copy-paste fails to parse (JSON.parse error, "Unexpected token", "Expecting property name"), or the user pastes JSON with trailing co…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when JSON from an LLM, API, log, config or copy-paste fails to parse (JSON.parse error, "Unexpected token", "Expecting property name"), or the user pastes JSON with trailing commas, single quotes, unquoted keys, comments, Python True/False/None, NaN, missing commas or brackets, a ```json fence, text around it, or output that was cut off. Deterministic repair: returns valid, formatted JSON plus a list of every fix with line and column. Values are never rewritten, so big numbers, number formatting and key order stay exactly as written. If the text is already valid it says so. Up to 100,000 characters.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Repair broken or LLM-generated JSON
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • mend_query_jsonUse when you need specific fields from a JSON document without reading all of it: $.users[0].name, $.items[*].id, $.a.b[-1], $.list[1:3], $..email (recursive).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mend_query_json" says "query": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "document": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when you need specific fields from a JSON document without reading all of it: $.users[0].name, $.items[*].id, $.a.b[-1], $.list[1:3], $..email (recursive). Returns each match with its exact path, type and value. Repairs the JSON first if needed, so broken input still works. Up to 100,000 characters.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Extract values from JSON by path
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 10, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mend.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including mend_repair_json (write), mend_outline_json (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 10, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 2

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 -> 2.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 3 to 2
  2. Tools1 removed, 2 changed.−1 removed~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mend https://mend.clawhard.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http mend https://mend.clawhard.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__mend__mend_query_json"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mend__mend_repair_json",
      "mcp__mend__mend_outline_json"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mend. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__mend__mend_query_json private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/mend/verify?hash=f746519153c937d8a903d325a818875e0dfb7969dd6b3443469d7a33f708b036" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f746519153c9, from Nov 9, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/mend/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.clawhard/mend
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.clawhard/mend.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/mend)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 9, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Mend MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Mend MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Mend MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Mend MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Mend MCP server have?

3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. mend_repair_json, mend_outline_json and mend_query_json.

Does the Mend MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Mend MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Mend MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 9, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.