Tack MCP server
com.clawhard/tackclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Check GitHub Actions workflows live: retired actions, bad inputs, injection. Pin actions to SHAs.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Tack MCP server can do
The Tack MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: tack_check_workflow), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (tack_resolve_actions); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (tack_check_workflow and tack_resolve_actions).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (long-description). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
tack_check_workflowUse when the user asks to write, review, fix or harden a GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/*.yml) or a composite action.yml, or when a workflow was just written or edited …Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,070 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ee private repositories, secrets or repository settings. Up to 200000 characters."
Description, as the server wrote it Use when the user asks to write, review, fix or harden a GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/*.yml) or a composite action.yml, or when a workflow was just written or edited and is about to be committed (signals: "write a CI workflow", "why does my workflow fail", "Invalid workflow file", "Unexpected input", "pin actions to SHA", "is actions/checkout@v4 still current", "Node 20 deprecated", "upload-artifact v3", "runs-on ubuntu-20.04", "script injection", "pull_request_target"). Parses the YAML (errors with line and column, duplicate keys, anchors), checks the structure against GitHub's workflow syntax as documented on 2026-11-19 (including recent keys such as schedule timezone, cache-mode, background, wait, wait-all, cancel, parallel and $/ self-repository references), then resolves every uses: reference live on github.com: whether the repository, tag, branch or commit exists, which release a SHA is, the latest release, retired versions that make a job fail (upload/download-artifact v3 and older, actions/cache v1-v2 and old exact pins), runs.using node20-or-older runtimes, with: inputs the action does not declare (with a did-you-mean), missing required inputs, reusable-workflow inputs, and pinned-SHA comments that name the wrong version. Also flags retired runner labels (live runner-images list), script injection through ${{ github.event... }} in run:, pull_request_target checkouts of PR code, and a missing permissions key. Returns each finding with line, path, fix and doc link, per-action resolution, fix_message, and pinned_workflow: the same file with every action pinned to its full commit SHA and a # version comment (retired or missing refs move to the latest release; upgrade:true moves all). Example: {"workflow":"on: push\njobs:\n test:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - uses: actions/setup-node@v4\n with:\n node_version: 20"}. Does not run the workflow, evaluate expressions or see private repositories, secrets or repository settings. Up to 200000 characters.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a GitHub Actions workflow and pin every action to a commit SHA (live)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
tack_resolve_actionsUse when a uses: line for a GitHub Action is about to be written and its current version, commit SHA or inputs are needed, or the user asks what the latest version of an action is,…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "tack_resolve_actions" says "resolve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "commit": it reads repositories.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Use when a uses: line for a GitHub Action is about to be written and its current version, commit SHA or inputs are needed, or the user asks what the latest version of an action is, what SHA a tag points to, or whether an action or tag exists (signals: "latest actions/checkout", "pin setup-node to a SHA", "what inputs does this action take", "does v9 exist", "which version is this SHA"). Takes owner/repo (latest release), owner/repo@ref or owner/repo/path@ref, reads the tags and branches live from github.com and the action.yml at that commit, and returns per action: exists or not, the commit SHA, the release a SHA or major tag points to, the latest release and major tag, runs.using (flags node20 and older, which GitHub stopped shipping on 2026-09-23), retired versions that fail jobs, the declared inputs, and a ready-to-paste line: uses: owner/repo@<40-char sha> # vX.Y.Z. Example: {"actions":["actions/checkout","actions/setup-node@v4","docker/build-push-action@v6"]}. Up to 30 per call. Public github.com repositories only; for a whole workflow file use tack_check_workflow.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Look up GitHub Actions: latest release, commit SHA, runtime and inputs (live)
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 19, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://tack.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including tack_check_workflow (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description is 2,070 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ee private repositories, secrets or repository settings. Up to 200000 characters."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tack https://tack.clawhard.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tack https://tack.clawhard.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tack__tack_resolve_actions"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tack__tack_check_workflow"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tack. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__tack__tack_check_workflow untrusted-input
- mcp__tack__tack_resolve_actions private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/tack/verify?hash=e7cd756903c7597aa54e7669ec8e9979017732c63f79892873217cbae1ddb7fd" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e7cd756903c7, from Nov 19, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/tack/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/tack)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 19, 2026, 15:17 UTC.
Tack MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Tack MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Tack MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Tack MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Tack MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. tack_check_workflow and tack_resolve_actions.
Does the Tack MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Tack MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Tack MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.