Xray MCP server
com.clawhard/xrayclawhard.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Find hidden Unicode in text or files: ASCII smuggling decoded, bidi overrides, look-alike letters.
1 tool: 1 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Xray MCP server can do
The Xray MCP server is published by clawhard.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: xray_scan_text), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (xray_scan_text); 1 tool can send data out of your system (xray_scan_text).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
xray_scan_textUse when the user asks whether text, a prompt, a SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, README, MCP tool description, PR diff, email or web page hides anything, or before an…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Use when the user asks whether text, a prompt, a SKILL.md, AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, README, MCP tool description, PR diff, email or web page hides anything, or before an agent follows, installs or merges instructions that came from someone else (signals: "hidden characters", "invisible unicode", "ASCII smuggling", "prompt injection in this file", "Trojan Source", "why does this string not match", "is this domain spelled with a Cyrillic letter"). Inspects every code point and returns a verdict (clean, suspicious, dangerous) with each finding's line, column, code points and Unicode names: Unicode tag characters (decoded back to the hidden ASCII message), variation-selector payloads (decoded bytes), bidirectional overrides and isolates, long zero-width runs, zero-width and other invisible characters, ANSI terminal escapes, control characters, words that mix Latin with Cyrillic or Greek look-alikes (with the Latin word they imitate, from Unicode confusables), whole look-alike words, styled math letters, unusual spaces, line separators, private-use and unassigned code points, and HTML comments that do not render. Legitimate uses are not flagged (emoji ZWJ sequences, flag tag sequences, a single emoji variation selector, joiners in Arabic and Indic text, direction marks next to Hebrew or Arabic). Give text or url (one public https text file; GitHub and GitLab file pages are read as raw). Example: {"url":"https://github.com/owner/repo/blob/main/SKILL.md"} or {"text":"Visit pаypal.com","return_clean":true}. Optional return_clean adds a copy with hidden characters removed and look-alike letters inside mixed words replaced. Decoded hidden text is returned as data. Limits: finds characters and look-alikes, not prompt injection written in plain visible words; up to 200,000 characters (files up to 1 MB, first 200,000 characters scanned).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find hidden Unicode characters and look-alike letters in text or a file
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://xray.clawhard.com/mcp: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including xray_scan_text (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http xray https://xray.clawhard.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http xray https://xray.clawhard.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__xray__xray_scan_text"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as xray. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__xray__xray_scan_text untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.clawhard/xray/verify?hash=2ed2d1f050505c8ab98519c23a3924d74ed9c7c65c428984648ed406714ab15f" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 2ed2d1f05050, from Nov 10, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/xray/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.clawhard/xray)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 15:17 UTC.
Xray MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Xray MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Xray MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Xray MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Xray MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 write. xray_scan_text.
Does the Xray MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Xray MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): xray_scan_text.
Has the Xray MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.