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screening MCP server

com.compliapi/screeningcompliapi.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

OFAC and global sanctions screening: crypto addresses, emails, websites, IDs, countries, VPN, geo

11 tools: 11 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 11 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

11 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the screening MCP server can do

The screening MCP server is published by compliapi.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 11 tools. It can create or change data (11 tools: screen_crypto_address, screen_email, screen_website, screen_government_id and 7 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (screen_pep, detect_vpn and geolocate_ip).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 12, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Changes things 11Claude Code: ask
  • detect_vpnDetect whether an IP address is using a VPN.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Detect whether an IP address is using a VPN.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Detect VPN usage
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • geolocate_ipGeolocate an IP address and flag whether it is in a sanctioned country.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Geolocate an IP address and flag whether it is in a sanctioned country.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Geolocate an IP address
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • screen_aircraftScreen an aircraft by registration (tail number, e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen an aircraft by registration (tail number, e.g. EP-GOL), manufacturer's serial number or Mode S transponder code (OFAC SDN publishes these). Exact match, ignoring punctuation and case; serial numbers under six characters are not indexed. Each match carries the aircraft model. `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen an aircraft
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_countryCheck whether a country or region carries sanctions designations (OFAC-curated today).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a country or region carries sanctions designations (OFAC-curated today). `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Check country sanctions
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_crypto_addressScreen a crypto address on any chain (or an ENS name, e.g.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a crypto address on any chain (or an ENS name, e.g. vitalik.eth) across the enabled sanctions and crime lists. `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a crypto address
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_emailScreen an email address across the enabled sanctions and crime lists.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen an email address across the enabled sanctions and crime lists. `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen an email address
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_government_idScreen a government-issued ID (passport, tax ID, …) across the enabled lists (fuzzy matching).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a government-issued ID (passport, tax ID, …) across the enabled lists (fuzzy matching). `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a government ID
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_nameScreen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against the primary names and aliases on the sanctions lists with name coverage (OFAC SDN and Consolidated, UN Security Council, E…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a person, company, vessel or aircraft name against the primary names and aliases on the sanctions lists with name coverage (OFAC SDN and Consolidated, UN Security Council, EU, UK, Swiss SECO, Canada, Australia DFAT, French Trésor, Japan MOF). Fuzzy, order- and accent-insensitive; each match has a 0-100 `score` and `reasons`. `type` restricts to one party type. `birth_date` (YYYY, YYYY-MM or YYYY-MM-DD) excludes listed individuals whose birth dates all disagree; `country` (ISO code or name) ranks matches by listed nationality/address/flag; `id_number` (passport, national ID or registration number) ranks a party listing that document first. `threshold`: minimum score (50-100, default 85). `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a name
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_pepScreen a person's name against the OpenSanctions PEP (politically exposed persons) dataset.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a person's name against the OpenSanctions PEP (politically exposed persons) dataset. Returns scored candidates; `pep` is true when any candidate clears the 0.7 match threshold. `birth_date` (YYYY-MM-DD, or partial) and `country` (name or ISO code) sharpen matching.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen for politically exposed persons
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • screen_vesselScreen a ship by IMO number (7 digits, with or without the "IMO" prefix) or MMSI (9 digits) across the lists that publish ship identifiers (OFAC SDN, UK, Swiss SECO, Canada, Austra…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a ship by IMO number (7 digits, with or without the "IMO" prefix) or MMSI (9 digits) across the lists that publish ship identifiers (OFAC SDN, UK, Swiss SECO, Canada, Australia, French Trésor). Exact match, ignoring each list's formatting; each match names the listed vessel. `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a vessel
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • screen_websiteScreen a website or domain across the enabled sanctions and crime lists.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Screen a website or domain across the enabled sanctions and crime lists. `lists`: optional comma-separated list slugs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Screen a website or domain
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:36 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
11
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://api.compliapi.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://api.compliapi.com/
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 11 tools that change things (11 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.compliapi.com/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_crypto_address (write), screen_email (write), screen_website (write), screen_government_id (write), screen_vessel (write) and 6 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 11

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 -> 11.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 8 to 11
  2. Tools3 added.+3 addedView diff
  3. Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http screening https://api.compliapi.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http screening https://api.compliapi.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__screening__screen_crypto_address",
      "mcp__screening__screen_email",
      "mcp__screening__screen_website",
      "mcp__screening__screen_government_id",
      "mcp__screening__screen_vessel",
      "mcp__screening__screen_aircraft",
      "mcp__screening__screen_name",
      "mcp__screening__screen_country",
      "mcp__screening__screen_pep",
      "mcp__screening__detect_vpn",
      "mcp__screening__geolocate_ip"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as screening. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__screening__screen_pep untrusted-input
  • mcp__screening__detect_vpn untrusted-input
  • mcp__screening__geolocate_ip untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.compliapi/screening/verify?hash=690de194706234573cdfea99a169712e5b0c7a257a45b2ed92a4f6ab598a42ab" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 690de1947062, from Nov 12, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.compliapi/screening/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.compliapi/screening
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.compliapi/screening.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.compliapi/screening)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:53 UTC.

screening MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the screening MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 11 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the screening MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the screening MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the screening MCP server have?

11 tools: 11 write. screen_crypto_address, screen_email, screen_website, screen_government_id, screen_vessel, screen_aircraft, screen_name, screen_country and 3 more.

Does the screening MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the screening MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the screening MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 12, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.