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AgentLedger MCP server

io.github.entradox/agent-ledgerentradoxstreamable-httpv0.4.7Scanned

Meter, cap, and block AI agent spend before the provider is charged.

18 tools: 4 can delete or cancel things, 10 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 4 delete, 0 irreversible, 10 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 10 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

14 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the AgentLedger MCP server can do

The AgentLedger MCP server is published by the GitHub account entradox. It has 18 tools. It can delete or cancel things (4 tools: ledger_rotate_secret, ledger_revoke_secret, ledger_set_budget and ledger_approval_decide) and create or change data (10 tools: ledger_track, ledger_report, ledger_proxy_attach, ledger_alerts and 6 more). 4 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (ledger_wait_events, ledger_approvals and read_skill); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (ledger_wait_events and read_skill); 1 tool can send data out of your system (read_skill). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 10 findings (credentials-mention, annotation-conflict and tool-shadowing). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.4.7.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

18 tools

Deletes or cancels 4Claude Code: deny
  • ledger_approval_decideApprove or deny a pending spend permit — workspace owner only.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "approve": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...an approval but can never decide one: a credential that can approve its own requests is no..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Approve or deny a pending spend permit — workspace owner only. The agent's own agent_secret can REQUEST an approval but can never decide one: a credential that can approve its own requests is not a control. decision must be 'approve' or 'deny'; only pending permits can be decided. An approved permit is consumed by the agent's next ledger_track within its amount — it is a one-shot exception, not a raised cap.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Approve or Deny a Spend Request
  • ledger_revoke_secretInvalidate an agent_id's agent_secret WITHOUT deleting its spend history.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ledger_revoke_secret" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...deleting its spend history. Use when a credential may have leaked, or to stop an agent wr..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Invalidate an agent_id's agent_secret WITHOUT deleting its spend history. Use when a credential may have leaked, or to stop an agent writing. Subsequent writes to that agent fail with agent_secret_mismatch until you rotate a new secret in. The agent_id stays claimed, so no other workspace can claim it and inherit the ledger. Requires the workspace_key that owns agent_id. Returns {"agent_id", "revoked": True, "_note"}, or {"error", "error_code"}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Revoke Agent Secret
  • ledger_rotate_secretMint a NEW agent_secret for an agent_id your workspace already owns, invalidating the old one.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ent whose secret was lost: the previous credential stops working immediately. Requires the..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Mint a NEW agent_secret for an agent_id your workspace already owns, invalidating the old one. Use this to RECOVER an agent whose secret was lost: the previous credential stops working immediately. Requires the workspace_key that owns agent_id — an agent's own agent_secret cannot rotate itself, because a leaked agent credential must not be able to lock its real owner out. Unlike ledger_track this never claims a new agent_id: an unknown id returns agent_not_claimed. The new secret is returned ONCE. Store it before you drop the response. Returns {"agent_id", "agent_secret", "_note"}, or {"error", "error_code"}.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Rotate Agent Secret
  • ledger_set_budgetSet spending caps for an agent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ledger_set_budget" says "set": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Set spending caps for an agent. Warns at 80%, blocks spend when exceeded — enforced: a ledger_track call that would cross the cap is rejected. Dollar caps (monthly_cents/daily_cents) and token caps (monthly_tokens/ daily_tokens) are independent dimensions: dollar caps only cover non-"tokens" rails, token caps only cover rail="tokens" bookkeeping rows (tokens_in/tokens_out). Set both if the agent uses both. Monthly cap is required; the rest are optional (0 = no limit). Overwrites any existing budget for the agent — with one rule: raising or removing an existing cap requires the workspace_key. An agent_secret can tighten its own caps but never loosen them; to grow an allowance the agent asks its owner (see ledger_request_approval). Claiming a brand-new agent_id requires your workspace_key; that first call mints an agent_secret (returned once — save it); later calls for that agent_id must pass the agent_secret back (no workspace_key needed again).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Set Agent Budget
Changes things 10Claude Code: ask
  • ledger_alertsAlert history for an agent: budget warnings (80% threshold) and spending spikes.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...shold) and spending spikes. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Alert history for an agent: budget warnings (80% threshold) and spending spikes. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or its workspace's workspace_key (same rule as GET /v1/alerts).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Agent Budget Alerts
  • ledger_api_docsSelf-serve documentation for AgentLedger — quickstart, MCP tools, REST endpoints, budget caps, error codes, and idempotency usage, as markdown.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Self-serve documentation for AgentLedger — quickstart, MCP tools, REST endpoints, budget caps, error codes, and idempotency usage, as markdown.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: AgentLedger API Docs
  • ledger_check_spendAsk BEFORE you spend: may this agent spend this much right now?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask BEFORE you spend: may this agent spend this much right now? Returns allowed (true/false), a stable reason code (within_budget, over_monthly_cap, over_daily_cap, over_monthly_token_cap, over_daily_token_cap, no_budget_set, unpriced_model), a one-line message, the cost estimate, the price used (with its source and as_of date) and every budget window with cap, spent and remaining. Same decision the /proxy/{provider} gate enforces. Read-only: nothing is recorded or reserved, so record the spend with ledger_track afterwards. Give exactly one spend shape: amount_cents (any rail, e.g. an x402 purchase), OR model with tokens_in/tokens_out.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Check Before Spending
  • ledger_examplesComplete, runnable Python recipe for a common AgentLedger integration pattern.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Complete, runnable Python recipe for a common AgentLedger integration pattern.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: AgentLedger Recipes
  • ledger_priceWhat will this call cost?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What will this call cost? Priced from the same table the caps use. Exists because ledger_track requires the CALLER to supply amount_cents, so an agent whose spend is capped could under-report its own cost and stay under the cap. This returns the number the enforcement path would use, so an agent can report honestly (and plan before it spends). Cost = (tokens_in * in_rate + tokens_out * out_rate) / 1_000_000. If the model has cache rates, the standard in-rate is used, which is the conservative direction for a spend cap. Every price carries the source it came from and the date it was read, and `verified: false` means the number was NOT read off the provider's own pricing page. Treat an unverified price as an estimate, not a measurement.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Price a Call Before You Make It
  • ledger_proxy_attachPoint your provider traffic at the proxy so budget caps are enforced BEFORE the provider is contacted, instead of being reported afterwards.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ledger_proxy_attach" says "attach": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...penAI and Anthropic SDKs. Your provider credential is NOT part of this: it stays in Author..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The server marks "ledger_proxy_attach" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true}; The name "ledger_proxy_attach" says "attach": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Point your provider traffic at the proxy so budget caps are enforced BEFORE the provider is contacted, instead of being reported afterwards. This closes the gap where the brake was unreachable from MCP: an agent connected over MCP could record spend (ledger_track) but nothing could refuse a call. With this, the cap is enforced on every LLM call. Returns the base_url to use, the two headers to send, and the exact change for the OpenAI and Anthropic SDKs. Your provider credential is NOT part of this: it stays in Authorization / x-api-key and is only forwarded, never stored.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Attach the Budget-Enforcing Proxy
  • ledger_reportSpend report for an agent over a rolling window.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...anomalies, and entry count. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Spend report for an agent over a rolling window. Returns total spend, breakdown by rail and by service, budget status (ok/warning/exceeded), detected anomalies, and entry count. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or its workspace's workspace_key (same rule as GET /v1/report).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Agent Spend Report
  • ledger_request_approvalAsk your workspace owner for a one-shot spend exception before a ledger_track that the cap would refuse.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ledger_request_approval" says "request": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask your workspace owner for a one-shot spend exception before a ledger_track that the cap would refuse. Creates a pending permit for exactly amount_cents on the given service. The owner (a human, or a supervisor agent holding the workspace_key) approves or denies it with ledger_approval_decide. An APPROVED permit is consumed by the next ledger_track for this agent whose amount fits inside it — the budget cap itself does not change. Permits expire after 1 hour undecided. Poll with ledger_approvals to see the decision. Claiming a brand-new agent_id requires workspace_key; otherwise pass the agent's agent_secret.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Request Spend Approval
  • ledger_startGet a FREE AgentLedger workspace with no credential and no arguments — the MCP equivalent of opening POST /start in a browser.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ledger_start" says "start": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...et a FREE AgentLedger workspace with no credential and no arguments — the MCP equivalent o..."

      What this check looks for
    • Warn

      The description contains "Every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

      Matched text

      description: "...s FIRST if you have no credentials yet. Every other tool here (ledger_track, ledger_set_budget,..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a FREE AgentLedger workspace with no credential and no arguments — the MCP equivalent of opening POST /start in a browser. Call this FIRST if you have no credentials yet. Every other tool here (ledger_track, ledger_set_budget, ledger_report, ledger_alerts) needs a workspace_key or an agent_secret, so a caller arriving with neither must start here or it has nowhere to go. Takes NO arguments on purpose: the goal is zero friction. It returns a `workspace_key` (shown exactly once — it cannot be re-revealed, so store it before continuing) which you then send as `workspace_key` on your first ledger_track for a NEW agent_id. That first write returns the agent's own `agent_secret`, which authenticates every write after it. The free tier includes every rail, enforced budget caps, alerts, reports and the MCP server, capped at 3 agents per workspace. Minting is rate-limited per caller IP, the same limit the human door uses. Prefer to pay? POST /v1/billing/x402 with a wallet-signed payment needs no human and buys 24h of Pro (agent allowance per the live pass tier — see /pricing.md).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Start a Workspace
  • ledger_trackRecord a spend entry for an AI agent on any payment rail, with optional token counts.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Record a spend entry for an AI agent on any payment rail, with optional token counts. Claiming a brand-new agent_id requires your workspace_key (get one via x402 at POST /v1/billing/x402 — no human, no login — or at /start). That first call mints an agent_secret and returns it in the response — save it, every later call for that same agent_id must pass it back (no workspace_key needed again) or the write is rejected. Amounts are capped at $100,000/entry and must be >= 0. If a budget is set for this agent, an entry that would cross the monthly/daily cap is blocked, not just logged. Caps here bind the AMOUNT YOU REPORT — a caller that lies to amount_cents lies to the cap. The only enforcement against real spend is routing the provider call through the /proxy/{provider} rail, which prices from the provider's own usage block. Include tokens_in/tokens_out + model on every LLM call so token burn shows up in the /v1/tokens report.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Track Agent Spend
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • ledger_approvalsList spend-approval permits — yours, or your whole workspace's.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a secret (input.agent_secret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List spend-approval permits — yours, or your whole workspace's.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: List Spend Approvals
  • ledger_wait_eventsLong-poll an agent's event feed — how an agent with no public URL receives alerts.Reads private dataReads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "ledger_wait_events" says "wait": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a secret (input.agent_secret), and the tool reads: it reads secrets.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...e escalation), redelivered. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Long-poll an agent's event feed — how an agent with no public URL receives alerts. Webhooks (POST /v1/webhooks) push events to a URL you own; an agent on stdio MCP cannot host one, so it waits here instead. Call this in a loop: the call holds open up to `timeout` seconds (max 30) and returns when events arrive or the wait lapses. `consumer_id` names this consumer durably — pick a stable one (e.g. "claude-code-main") and reuse it. Each call returns a `cursor`; pass it back on your next call once you have processed that batch — that is the ack. To get restart redelivery, also pass `client_instance` (your process id or any per-boot token) and `client_started` (when your process booted): when the pair changes, events that were served but never acked come back with `redelivered: true`, so nothing is lost to a crash between serve and process. (The stdio MCP server supplies its own pid/started automatically — hosted callers must opt in because the gateway cannot see the client's process.) Each event is an envelope: id (deterministic — dedupe on it), kind (alert.raised | budget.warning | budget.exceeded | anomaly.detected), summary, context (agent_id, alert_type, timestamp), alerts_since_last_write (how many alerts are stacked up since the agent's last spend write — use it to throttle escalation), redelivered. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or its workspace's workspace_key (same rule as GET /v1/agents/{agent_id}/events/wait).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Wait for Agent Events
  • read_skillRead a product skill file by its skill:// URI.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "read_skill" says "read": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "uri": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.uri), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.uri): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read a product skill file by its skill:// URI.
  • skills_list_toolList this product's skills.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "skills_list_tool" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List this product's skills. Each entry carries the SKILL.md URI, its name and description, verbatim frontmatter, and a per-file sha256 manifest. Read a body with `read_skill`.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-ledger__read_skill"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:04 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
14
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://aiagentscity.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 14 tools that change things (4 destructive, 10 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/: tools/list returned 18 tools to an anonymous client, including ledger_rotate_secret (destructive), ledger_revoke_secret (destructive), ledger_set_budget (destructive), ledger_approval_decide (destructive), ledger_track (write) and 9 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn8 info
  • The server marks "ledger_proxy_attach" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true}; The name "ledger_proxy_attach" says "attach": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The description contains "Every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

    Matched text

    description: "...s FIRST if you have no credentials yet. Every other tool here (ledger_track, ledger_set_budget,..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ent whose secret was lost: the previous credential stops working immediately. Requires the..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...deleting its spend history. Use when a credential may have leaked, or to stop an agent wr..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...anomalies, and entry count. Requires a credential: either the agent's own agent_secret or..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...penAI and Anthropic SDKs. Your provider credential is NOT part of this: it stays in Author..."

    What this check looks for
Show 4 more findings

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.7. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-ledger https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/
claude mcp add --transport http agent-ledger https://aiagentscity.com/mcp/

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_wait_events",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_approvals",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__skills_list_tool"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_track",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_report",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_proxy_attach",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_alerts",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_check_spend",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_request_approval",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_price",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_start",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_api_docs",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_examples",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__read_skill"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_rotate_secret",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_revoke_secret",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_set_budget",
      "mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_approval_decide"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-ledger. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_wait_events private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__agent-ledger__ledger_approvals private-data
  • mcp__agent-ledger__read_skill private-data, untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.entradox/agent-ledger/verify?hash=e8b97538527a5990529e47a6f50e19c50f126d780d2743f8fe1029b44f8a9155" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e8b97538527a, from Nov 19, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.entradox/agent-ledger/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:33 UTC.

AgentLedger MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentLedger MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 18 tools, 14 of which can change, send or delete something, and 10 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the AgentLedger MCP server delete data?

Yes. 4 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: ledger_rotate_secret, ledger_revoke_secret, ledger_set_budget and ledger_approval_decide.

Can the AgentLedger MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentLedger MCP server have?

18 tools: 4 destructive, 10 write, 4 read. ledger_rotate_secret, ledger_revoke_secret, ledger_set_budget, ledger_approval_decide, ledger_track, ledger_report, ledger_proxy_attach, ledger_alerts and 10 more.

Does the AgentLedger MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgentLedger MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): read_skill.

Has the AgentLedger MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.