TrustScan MCP server
io.github.entradox/trust-scanentradoxstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Security scanner for MCP servers and skills: Unicode injection, patterns, secrets.
4 tools: 2 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the TrustScan MCP server can do
The TrustScan MCP server is published by the GitHub account entradox. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: trust_scan_server and trust_scan_file), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (read_skill); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (read_skill); 1 tool can send data out of your system (read_skill). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
trust_scan_fileSecurity-scan a single file for invisible Unicode, dangerous patterns, and secrets.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Security-scan a single file for invisible Unicode, dangerous patterns, and secrets. Returns a severity-weighted score and per-finding detail (rule, severity, location). Read-only: the file is never modified.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Scan Single File
trust_scan_serverSecurity-scan an MCP server or skill package before trusting it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Security-scan an MCP server or skill package before trusting it. Runs all four checks — invisible Unicode prompt-injection, dangerous code patterns (MCP001–006), hardcoded secrets, typosquat package names — and returns a 0-100 score, letter grade, and detailed findings. Run this on any directory BEFORE wiring it into your agent. Read-only: never modifies the scanned target.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Scan MCP Server or Skill Package
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
read_skillRead a product skill file by its skill:// URI.Reads private dataReads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "read_skill" says "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "file": it reads files.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "read" and "uri": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.uri), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.uri): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Read a product skill file by its skill:// URI.
skills_list_toolList this product's skills.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "skills_list_tool" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List this product's skills. Each entry carries the SKILL.md URI, its name and description, verbatim frontmatter, and a per-file sha256 manifest. Read a body with `read_skill`.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__trust-scan__read_skill"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:04 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including trust_scan_server (write), trust_scan_file (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http trust-scan https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/claude mcp add --transport http trust-scan https://trust-scan-production.up.railway.app/mcp/Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__trust-scan__skills_list_tool"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__trust-scan__trust_scan_server",
"mcp__trust-scan__trust_scan_file",
"mcp__trust-scan__read_skill"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trust-scan. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__trust-scan__read_skill private-data, untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.entradox/trust-scan/verify?hash=0681fbaa981cb1d6aacdbc29195aa6941d7d72c26a393375c2de6c852433b333" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 0681fbaa981c, from Nov 19, 2026, 16:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.entradox/trust-scan/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.entradox/trust-scan)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:33 UTC.
TrustScan MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the TrustScan MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the TrustScan MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the TrustScan MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the TrustScan MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 2 write, 2 read. trust_scan_server, trust_scan_file, skills_list_tool and read_skill.
Does the TrustScan MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the TrustScan MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): read_skill.
Has the TrustScan MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.