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nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server

io.github.mrpkk/nidhipatimrpkkstreamable-httpv0.7.1Scanned

Proof-of-spend and reserve checks for AI agents: receipts, spend audit, NAV, reconciliation.

5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server can do

The nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account mrpkk. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: verify_receipt, reserve_report and reconcile_books), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 0.7.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • reconcile_booksMatch invoices to stablecoin transfers by memo first, then exact amount and asset inside the invoice window.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Match invoices to stablecoin transfers by memo first, then exact amount and asset inside the invoice window. Names what is left over in both directions: invoices nobody paid, money nobody invoiced, invoices paid twice. A duplicate is counted once, never twice. Do NOT use as proof of who the payer was.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Reconcile invoices against transfers
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • reserve_reportTurn an issuer's reserve lines into a NAV with explicit formulas and a sha256 evidence hash per line.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Turn an issuer's reserve lines into a NAV with explicit formulas and a sha256 evidence hash per line. Verdict is backed, underbacked, or incomplete - and the backing ratio is refused (null) when any line has no price, because a ratio over half a reserve is not a number. Do NOT treat the result as a statutory audit.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Reserve and NAV report
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • verify_receiptCheck a signed proof-of-spend receipt offline: schema, Ed25519 signature, mandate expiry, positive amount, quantity*unit_price == amount, refund not above payment.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a signed proof-of-spend receipt offline: schema, Ed25519 signature, mandate expiry, positive amount, quantity*unit_price == amount, refund not above payment. Use when an agent or provider returns a receipt and you need to know whether it actually proves the charge was allowed. Do NOT use to move funds or to confirm a transaction on-chain - nothing here reads a chain.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify an agent payment receipt
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • audit_spendFind duplicates, price escalation, failed-but-billed calls, runaway loops, missing refunds, model overpay, unknown asset/network and budget breaches in a list of settled agent call…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find duplicates, price escalation, failed-but-billed calls, runaway loops, missing refunds, model overpay, unknown asset/network and budget breaches in a list of settled agent calls. Returns three separate amounts (money without a basis, estimate above the agent's own median, budget overrun) instead of one sum, because adding them together would overstate what can be recovered. Do NOT use as a statement of money actually returned.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Audit an agent's spending records
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • resolve_reportWeigh the sources a resolver says it read against the declared outcome.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_report" says "resolve": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Weigh the sources a resolver says it read against the declared outcome. Verdicts: supported, disputed, single_source, insufficient. A conflict is reported as a conflict, never averaged. Do NOT use to trade or to place a position.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Resolution evidence
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 16, 2026, 14:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 25, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://rta.lat/nidhipati/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_receipt (write), reserve_report (write), reconcile_books (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.7.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http nidhipati https://rta.lat/nidhipati/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http nidhipati https://rta.lat/nidhipati/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__nidhipati__audit_spend",
      "mcp__nidhipati__resolve_report"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__nidhipati__verify_receipt",
      "mcp__nidhipati__reserve_report",
      "mcp__nidhipati__reconcile_books"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as nidhipati. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mrpkk/nidhipati/verify?hash=9316bb6885e86f62729babd9649c83b302174e7b02cbaea677340d5acd0e59e6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 9316bb6885e8, from Nov 17, 2026, 20:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mrpkk/nidhipati/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.mrpkk/nidhipati
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.mrpkk/nidhipati.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mrpkk/nidhipati)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 4, 2026, 04:17 UTC.

nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server have?

5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. verify_receipt, reserve_report, reconcile_books, audit_spend and resolve_report.

Does the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the nidhipati — proof of spend for AI agents MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 17, 2026.