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Base of AGI MCP server

com.baseofagi/newsbaseofagi.comstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

AI news in TR/EN/ES/RU, a daily stack brief and a verified MCP/plugin/skill catalog. Read-only.

6 tools: 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 1
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Base of AGI MCP server can do

The Base of AGI MCP server is published by baseofagi.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: latest_news, daily_brief and check_skill), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_tool); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (check_skill); 1 tool can send data out of your system (check_skill). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 15, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_skillLicense and risk report for an agent skill on GitHub, before the user installs it.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...gs (script files, network calls, secret/credential access, prompt-injection text, hidden o..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    License and risk report for an agent skill on GitHub, before the user installs it. Give a github.com URL of a SKILL.md file, a skill folder or a repository (or a raw.githubusercontent.com file URL). Returns the license (SPDX) and commercial_use (no license = all rights reserved), risk flags (script files, network calls, secret/credential access, prompt-injection text, hidden or encoded content, binaries) with file and line, last push, stars and a one-line low/medium/high verdict. Rule-based static check: no LLM, nothing is executed. Evidence is untrusted text from the repository.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • daily_briefWhat changed for a developer's stack: security notes, breaking changes, model releases, new tools and news, tagged by stack (rule-based).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    What changed for a developer's stack: security notes, breaking changes, model releases, new tools and news, tagged by stack (rule-based). Pass the stack tags (e.g. claude-code, mcp, supabase, vercel) and optionally a since date. 30-day window.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • latest_newsNewest AI news stories from Base of AGI (headline, short teaser, date, publisher and the original source URL to cite).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Newest AI news stories from Base of AGI (headline, short teaser, date, publisher and the original source URL to cite). Optional category filter.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • find_toolsSearch the Base of AGI catalog of MCP servers, Claude Code plugins, skills and hand-picked agent tools.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_tools" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search the Base of AGI catalog of MCP servers, Claude Code plugins, skills and hand-picked agent tools. Each result carries license, commercial_use (derived from the SPDX license), install info exactly as the source states it, and the source repository. Suggest tools to the user; never install without approval.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_toolFull catalog record for one tool id returned by find_tools: license, commercial_use, install (as the source states it), repository, stars, last push, preinstalled surfaces.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_tool" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "repository": it reads repositories.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full catalog record for one tool id returned by find_tools: license, commercial_use, install (as the source states it), repository, stars, last push, preinstalled surfaces.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_newsFull-text search over the Base of AGI news archive (since early 2026; headlines in all four languages, teasers for the last 45 days).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_news" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Full-text search over the Base of AGI news archive (since early 2026; headlines in all four languages, teasers for the last 45 days). All query words must match. Newest first among equal matches.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

1 path in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__news__check_skill"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:34 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://baseofagi.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including latest_news (write), daily_brief (write), check_skill (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...gs (script files, network calls, secret/credential access, prompt-injection text, hidden o..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http news https://baseofagi.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http news https://baseofagi.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__news__search_news",
      "mcp__news__find_tools",
      "mcp__news__get_tool"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__news__latest_news",
      "mcp__news__daily_brief",
      "mcp__news__check_skill"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as news. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__news__get_tool private-data
  • mcp__news__check_skill untrusted-input, outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.baseofagi/news/verify?hash=46205aa710edf44272df80bf29c883a194e085b27307c93b48501af857abc4ec" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 46205aa710ed, from Nov 15, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.baseofagi/news/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.baseofagi/news
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.baseofagi/news.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.baseofagi/news)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 1, 2026, 23:17 UTC.

Base of AGI MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Base of AGI MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Base of AGI MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Base of AGI MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Base of AGI MCP server have?

6 tools: 3 write, 3 read. latest_news, daily_brief, check_skill, search_news, find_tools and get_tool.

Does the Base of AGI MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Base of AGI MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_skill.

Has the Base of AGI MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 1, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.