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Base Intel MCP server

com.datakoot/base-onchain-wallet-tokensdatakoot.comstreamable-httpv2.1.0Scanned

Read-only on-chain intelligence for AI agents on Base: balances, tokens, gas, tx status.

5 tools: 4 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Base Intel MCP server can do

The Base Intel MCP server is published by datakoot.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: address_report, token_info, token_balance and gas_now), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (address_report, token_info, token_balance and 2 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 2.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • address_reportOne-call snapshot of any Base address: ETH balance, USDC balance, transaction count, and whether it is a smart contract or a regular wallet.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One-call snapshot of any Base address: ETH balance, USDC balance, transaction count, and whether it is a smart contract or a regular wallet. Use it to sanity-check a counterparty or a payment address before sending funds. Input: a 0x address.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Address Report
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • gas_nowCurrent gas price on the Base network (Coinbase's Ethereum L2), in gwei and wei, read live from a Base RPC node.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Current gas price on the Base network (Coinbase's Ethereum L2), in gwei and wei, read live from a Base RPC node. Use before sending a Base transaction or estimating its cost. Takes no input.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Gas Now
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_balanceHow much of an ERC-20 token a wallet holds on Base, returned both human-formatted (using the token's decimals) and raw.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How much of an ERC-20 token a wallet holds on Base, returned both human-formatted (using the token's decimals) and raw. Pass the token contract address and the holder address, both 0x + 40 hex. Example: USDC 0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Token Balance
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • token_infoERC-20 token metadata on Base, read on-chain: name, symbol, decimals, and total supply, plus whether the address really behaves like an ERC-20.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    ERC-20 token metadata on Base, read on-chain: name, symbol, decimals, and total supply, plus whether the address really behaves like an ERC-20. Use it to verify a token contract before trusting or displaying it. Input: the token contract address (0x + 40 hex).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Token Info
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • tx_statusLook up a Base transaction by hash and report whether it is pending, succeeded, or failed, with from, to, value, block number, and gas used.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "tx_status" says "status": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Look up a Base transaction by hash and report whether it is pending, succeeded, or failed, with from, to, value, block number, and gas used. Use it to confirm a payment or contract call landed. Input: the transaction hash (0x + 64 hex; the 0x is optional).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Tx Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:36 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://base.datakoot.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including address_report (write), token_info (write), token_balance (write), gas_now (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 2.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http base-onchain-wallet-tokens https://base.datakoot.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http base-onchain-wallet-tokens https://base.datakoot.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__tx_status"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__address_report",
      "mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__token_info",
      "mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__token_balance",
      "mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__gas_now"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as base-onchain-wallet-tokens. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__address_report untrusted-input
  • mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__token_info untrusted-input
  • mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__token_balance untrusted-input
  • mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__gas_now untrusted-input
  • mcp__base-onchain-wallet-tokens__tx_status untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.datakoot/base-onchain-wallet-tokens/verify?hash=0e462eda9757e6511d30a7dbde6e52d99e8288e55d12ac3531c0545d6f17b1e1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 0e462eda9757, from Nov 10, 2026, 14:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.datakoot/base-onchain-wallet-tokens/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for com.datakoot/base-onchain-wallet-tokens
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/com.datakoot/base-onchain-wallet-tokens.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.datakoot/base-onchain-wallet-tokens)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 17:53 UTC.

Base Intel MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Base Intel MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Base Intel MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Base Intel MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Base Intel MCP server have?

5 tools: 4 write, 1 read. address_report, token_info, token_balance, gas_now and tx_status.

Does the Base Intel MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Base Intel MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Base Intel MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.