Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server
com.oroboros-design.angel/base-token-auditangel.oroboros-design.comstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
ERC-20 honeypot and rug-pull check on Base and Ethereum, plus free swap route data.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server can do
The Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server is published by angel.oroboros-design.com, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: token_risk and buy_pack_with_card), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (token_risk, buy_pack_with_card and get_swap_route).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 14, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
buy_pack_with_cardFor agents and people without USDC: prepaid packs paid in EUR by card or Link (100 calls €5.00 · 500 calls €25.00 · 5,000 calls €199.00) — including Link's wallet for agents (one-t…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it For agents and people without USDC: prepaid packs paid in EUR by card or Link (100 calls €5.00 · 500 calls €25.00 · 5,000 calls €199.00) — including Link's wallet for agents (one-time card, approved by the human). Returns checkout_url; after payment the success page (Accept: application/json) returns the bundle_token, and it is e-mailed. After: get_signals with bundle_token.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
token_riskHoneypot and rug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base or Ethereum before a swap, approval or signature, read straight from the contract: upgradeable proxy (EIP-1967, beacon, clone), ow…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Honeypot and rug-pull check for an ERC-20 on Base or Ethereum before a swap, approval or signature, read straight from the contract: upgradeable proxy (EIP-1967, beacon, clone), owner powers in the bytecode (mint, pause, blacklist, fee or max-tx setters, trading switch, burn from any address), owner renounced or active and the owner's share of supply; known issuers labeled. Risk low, medium or high with reasons. Signals, not investment advice. 0.99 USDC base (new payers 0.99, >10 payments 0.693; 20 pack calls). After: gas-window before you trade on that chain (the result's next field has the exact call).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
get_swap_routeFree route data: the best swap route on Base (or Ethereum) for a token you already checked with token_risk — quote, minimum out, approval target and, with taker, the unsigned trans…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_swap_route" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Free route data: the best swap route on Base (or Ethereum) for a token you already checked with token_risk — quote, minimum out, approval target and, with taker, the unsigned transaction you sign and send yourself. Technical data and risk-analysis service only: no custody, no order execution, no investment advice. Disclosed: the 0.5 % integrator fee is a technical API provisioning fee for computing the route data, deducted by the aggregator inside the swap and sent to Angel's wallet; buy_amount is already net of it. Run token_risk on buy_token first. After: approve the spender if approval is set, then send the transaction from your own wallet.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:18 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://angel.oroboros-design.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://angel.oroboros-design.com
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- no
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/base-token-audit: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including token_risk (write), buy_pack_with_card (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http base-token-audit https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/base-token-auditclaude mcp add --transport http base-token-audit https://angel.oroboros-design.com/mcp/base-token-auditRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__base-token-audit__get_swap_route"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__base-token-audit__token_risk",
"mcp__base-token-audit__buy_pack_with_card"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as base-token-audit. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__base-token-audit__token_risk untrusted-input
- mcp__base-token-audit__buy_pack_with_card untrusted-input
- mcp__base-token-audit__get_swap_route untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/com.oroboros-design.angel/base-token-audit/verify?hash=81ba82a7dd671ff275a9d041ddefac5876239ff0e14d9eab0292771f65da99e4" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 81ba82a7dd67, from Nov 14, 2026, 20:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.oroboros-design.angel/base-token-audit/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/com.oroboros-design.angel/base-token-audit)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 14, 2026, 20:17 UTC.
Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. token_risk, buy_pack_with_card and get_swap_route.
Does the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Base Token Audit — ERC-20 honeypot check and swap route data MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 14, 2026.