Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server
work.agentexchange/base-token-large-transfersagentexchange.workstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Largest token transfers (whale movements) on Base over recent blocks. x402, 0.02 per call.
1 tool: 1 do something that can't be undone.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here does something that can't be undone. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server can do
The Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server is published by agentexchange.work, a domain the MCP Registry verified. It has 1 tool. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (base_token_large_transfers), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (base_token_large_transfers).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
1 tool
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
base_token_large_transfersLargest token transfers (whale movements) on Base in the last minutes to hour: the biggest ERC-20 Transfer events of a token over a window of up to 1,000 blocks with amount, sender…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "base_token_large_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "base_token_large_transfers" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "base_token_large_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
Description, as the server wrote it Largest token transfers (whale movements) on Base in the last minutes to hour: the biggest ERC-20 Transfer events of a token over a window of up to 1,000 blocks with amount, sender, receiver and transaction hash, filtered by a minimum amount (token=0x..., min_amount, blocks=400, count=20). For trading and risk agents watching large flows. Pay per call $0.02 USDC on Base via x402.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Largest token transfers (whale movements) on Base in the last minutes to hour: the biggest ERC-20 Transfer events of a t
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 irreversible). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://feeds.agentexchange.work/mcp?tools=base_token_large_transfers: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including base_token_large_transfers (irreversible)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "base_token_large_transfers" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "base_token_large_transfers" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http base-token-large-transfers https://feeds.agentexchange.work/mcp?tools=base_token_large_transfersclaude mcp add --transport http base-token-large-transfers https://feeds.agentexchange.work/mcp?tools=base_token_large_transfersRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__base-token-large-transfers__base_token_large_transfers"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as base-token-large-transfers. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__base-token-large-transfers__base_token_large_transfers untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/work.agentexchange/base-token-large-transfers/verify?hash=23d53630c36d1e4dcc2245ac7460b4875c5de050c7c682fe8c7fc441e2946148" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 23d53630c36d, from Nov 20, 2026, 12:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.agentexchange/base-token-large-transfers/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/work.agentexchange/base-token-large-transfers)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 13:18 UTC.
Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: base_token_large_transfers.
What tools does the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server have?
- 1 tool: 1 irreversible. base_token_large_transfers.
Does the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Base whale transfers (x402) MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.